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xperience has demonstrated, time and again, that the application of international humanitarian law (IH L) on the battlefield is an exercise of extreme intricacy. No aspect of this body oflaw has proven more difficult to apply than that
governing targeting-the use of force against enemy forces, material and facilities .
Combat operations in Afghanistan since October 7, 2001, the date on which the
United States and its coalition partners launched Operation Enduring Freedom,
have aptly illustrated the complexity of targeting in modern warfare.
This article examines targeting practices dur ing the Operation Enduring Freedom campaign through 2008, with emphasis on US operations. Specifically, it explores the role law played in the calculations of those responsible for planning,
approving and conducting "attacks," defined in IHLas "acts of violence against the
enemy, whether in offence or defence."l As will become apparent, their decisions
were determined less by law than by either the operational realities of the battlefield
or, in a Clausewitzian sense, the policy dictates underpinning the conflict.
Reference is largely to the law applicable in international armed conflict, that is,
the law governing hostilities between States. 2 Although debate continues over
whether the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200 1 launched a conflict of this
• Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode
Island.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghan istan
character,3 the October 7 coalition strikes against Taliban and terrorist forces based
in Afghanistan unquestionably did so, one between Afghanistan and the States participating in the US-led coalition.4 Arguably, the conflict became non-international
in June 2002, when the Loya Jirga elected Hamid Karzai President of the Transitional Authority, an act which the United Nations recognized as establishing legitimate indigenous governance over a sovereign Afghanistan.5 Today, the "war" in
Afghanistan comprises a non-international armed conflict between the Afghan
government (supported by foreign States) and various armed groups, most notably the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.6
Although the conflict has become non-international, it must be understood that
the IHL norms governing attacks during international armed conflicts, on one
hand, and non-international armed conflicts, on the other, have become nearly indistinguishable. In particular, the foundatio nallHL principle of distinction, which
requires those involved in hostilities to "at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives," applies equally in all conflicts? That being so, the humanitarian law
governing international armed conflict always serves as an appropriate benchmark
against which to measure targeting practices.
The Operational Environment
Afghanistan presented a multifarious environment in which to apply targeting
law.8 The country's physical and human terrains are of unparalleled complexity. At
nearly 650,000 square kilometers, it is roughly the size of Texas. Much of the country
is mountainous and few roads or other means of transportation exist. The 5,500kilometer border is ill-defined and porous. These features often compelled US
forces to employ airpower in lieu of ground operations. Habitation is widely scattered and predominantly rural, and combatants are seldom distinguishable from
civilians by dress. The operational result was an unusually heavy reliance on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, rather than visual identification by an attacker. Complex ethnic and tribal relationships, characterized. by
shifting alliances, complicated matters. Indeed, Afghans typically have less sense of
identity as such than as Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Turkmens, Uzbeks or members
of other similar groups. In many cases, these ethnic groups straddle borders with
Afghanistan's neighbors-Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
China.
Perhaps most significantly, Afghanistan's recent history has been one of constant warfare, from the internal conflict and ensuing Soviet invasion of 1979,
through the Soviet withdrawal a decade later, and into the war that led to the 1996
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Taliban victory. Defeat of the Taliban by the US-led coalition in late 2001 ushered
in the period of hostilities considered here. Many Afghans have known nothing but
war, and many have found themselves on both sides of the battle lines at different
times. A massive illegal narcotics infrastructure fmancially fuels these conflicts. Afghanistan is presently the world's largest producer of opium, with an output of
eight thousand metric tons in 2008. Since unemployment runs at 40 percent, and
in light of a per capita gross domestic product of a meager $800, both the drug trade
and conflict offer attractive means of subsistence.9
As noted, terrain, distance and infrastructure led the coalition forces to rely
heavily on air attacks. Political demands for a quick response to September 11, the
practical difficulty of rapidly deploying ground forces and fear of repeating the disastrous Soviet experience fu rther led to an emphasis on air operations. IO During the
initial phase of hostilities, friendly indigenous armed groups, supported by US and
coalition special forces, shouldered responsibility for most ground operations.
However, once the conflict morphed into a classic insurgency, ground operations
assumed increasing importance. Nevertheless, air attack remains a dominant feature of the war in Afghanistan.

Targeti ng in a Counterinsurgency
Within months, the conflict in Afghanistan became an insurgency in which traditional methods of warfare no longer sufficed. I I As US military doctrine recognizes,
the application of force to defeat an insurgency must be but part of a broader strategy
that incorporates paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions.
The application of a purely military approach to irregular warfare [JWI has not proved
successful in the past. JW is about winning a war of ideas and perception. Its battles are
fought amongst the people and its outcomes are determined by the perceptions and
support of the people. The campaign must change the perception and offer viable
alternatives. rather than specifically kill an enemy or destroy his resources in
isolation. 12
This reality necessitates carefully measured use of force, lest the complementary
components of the strategy suffer. The current US counterinsurgency (COIN)
manual accordingly cautions,
[a Iny use of force generates a series of reactions. ... Counterinsurgents should calculate
carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any
operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral
damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents . ... [Thus.1 it is vital fo r
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commanders to adopt appropriate and measured levels of force and apply that force
precisely so that it accomplishes the mission without causing unnecessary loss oflife or
suffering.n
Sensitivity to the reverberating consequences o f an attack that causes civilian casualties lies at the heart of coun terinsurgency strategy, for " using substantial force .. .
increases the o pportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal, [while1 using force precisely and discrim inateiy strengthens the
rule oflaw that needs to be established. "14
Ultimately, the key is legitimacy with the population, the support o f which constitutes the ultimate objective of all counterinsurgencies. The term "legitimacy"
unsurprisinglyappears 131 times in the COIN manual. In 2008, it was elevated to a
" principle o f war" for US joint operations. Along with perseverance and restraint,
similarly relevant in the context of targeting, legitimacy joined the nine traditional
principles: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, u nity of command, security, surprise and simplicity.IS
The legitimacy imperative undergirds US targeting doctrine. As an example, the
Air Force requires consideration of the following factors during the "target validation" phase of planning. 16
• Does the target meet [combined fo rce air component commander] or higher
commanders' objectives, guidance, and intent?
Is the target consistent with [law of anned conflict] and [rules of engagement]?
Is the desired effect on the target consistent with the end state?
Is the target politically or culturally "sensitive?"
• What will the effect of striking it be on public opinion (enemy, friendly, and
neutral)?
What are the risks and likely consequences of collateral damage?
Is it feasible to attack this target? What is the risk?
Is it feasible to attack the target at this time?
What are the consequences of not attacking the target?
Will attacking the target negatively affect friendly operations due to current or
planned friendly exploitation of the target?
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Clearly, counterinsurgency targeting planners must be especially sensitive to issues
beyond the immediate military utility ofa strike and the legal norms governing it.
The collateral damage estimate methodology (CDEM) employed by us forces
reflects this sensitivity.17 "Collateral damage" refers to incidental injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects caused during an attack on a lawful target.
CDEM sets forth "standardized procedures for determining potential collateral
damage, options available to mitigate that damage, and approval authorities for
strikes based on the anticipated collateral damage during the conduct of operations. "18 Although the precise parameters of CDEM are classified, in general terms
the methodology involves using computer-assisted modeling, intelligence analysis, weaponeering and human vetting to assess likely collateral damage and determine the level at which a preplanned strike must be approved. 19 lt further requires
particular caution when attacking dual-use targets, when employing duster munitions or when civilians are present within military objectives.

The Law of Targeting in Brief
The law of targeting is, from a theoretical and undeconstructed perspective, fairly
straightforward. 20 Consistent with the principle of distinction, attacks may only be
conducted against military objectives, including members of the armed forces and
other organized armed groups participating in the conflict. 21 Objects which by
"nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage" qualify as military
objectives.22 By the "use" criterion, civilian objects may become military objectives
when the enemy employs them for military ends. Analogously, civilians may be
targeted shou1d they "directly participate in hostilities. "23 Attacks must not be indiscriminate; that is, they must be directed against a specific military objective and
may not treat "as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects. "24
When engaging a lawful target, the attacker may be barred from employing certain weapons. Such restrictions derive either from the customary law forbidding
the employment of indiscriminate weapons 2S and those which cause unnecessary
suffering or superfluous injury,26 or from specific treaty restrictions, such as the
Dublin Treaty on cluster munitions, for States partyP
Even assuming a lawful target and permitted weapon, an attacker must take
"feasible precautions" to minimize collateral damage. Specifically, "the commander must decide, in light of all the facts known or reasonably available to him,
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including the need to conserve resources and complete the mission successfully,
whether to adopt an alternative method of attack, if reasonably available, to reduce
civilian casualties and damage. " 28 Considerations indude weapon and tactic options, as well as alternative targets that can be attacked to attain a "similar military
advantage."
Finally, attacks that violate the principle of proportionality are unlawful. An attack will breach the standard if it is "expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."29 The rule of proportionality is often misconstrued as either prohibiting
"extensive" collateral damage or as a test which balances collateral damage against
military advantage. In fact, it bars attack only when no proportionality at all exists
between the ends sought and the expected harm to civilians and civilian objects.
Restated, the linchpin term "excessive" indicates unreasonable collateral damage
in light of the reasonably anticipated military advantage expected to result from
the attack 30
Law and Targeting in Afghanistan

That law limits targeting options is self-evident. However, the nature of a conflict
equally affects application of the law, sometimes by necessitating policy and operational limitations that exceed those found in international humanitarian law.
Nowhere has this dynamic been more apparent than during operations in
Afghanistan.
The legitimacy imperative, so prominent in counterinsurgency doctrine, was
the driving force behind targeting practices in the conflict. Early high-visibility
mistakes drew international attention to the US operations. Of particular note
were two mistaken strikes on an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
warehouse in the first month of the conflict and an attack on a wedding party in
November. 3 ! Resultantly, the incentive to avoid future mistakes and, indeed, even
lawful collateral damage, grew quickly.
Intent on avoiding unintended harm to the civilian population, commanders
imposed strict restrictions on the conduct of operations. For instance, the International Security Assistance Force Commander directed his forces to employ precision munitions whenever possible; humanitarian law imposes no such
requirement. Additionally, he directed on-scene commanders to make every effort
to ensure houses from which their troops received fire were free of innocent civilians before respondingP even though, as a matter of IHL, returning fire in such
circumstances is governed by the rule of proportionality and the requirement to
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take feasible precautions in attack, not by the m ere presence of civilians. Further, in
2007 the United States and NATO restricted the use of airstrikes during troops-incontact (TIC) situations, often opting for withdrawal rather than engagement. US
forces also increasingly employed small-diameter bombs (low-collateral-damage
bombs). Again, IH L would not necessarily mandate such practices.
Despite such efforts, civilian casualties continued to occur. H uman Rights
Watch estimates that in 2007 over 1,600 civilians were killed in the conflict. Nine
hundred fifty died as a result of Taliban and AI Qaeda actions, whereas 434 of the
casualties were attributable to US and NATO actions (3 12 in airstrikes and 113
during ground action). Another fifty-seven died in crossfire between the warring
parties and the circumstances surrounding the deaths of 192 were unclear.33
President Karzai, struggling with the public-opinion fallout of civilian casualties,
repeatedly ad dressed the issue, Following a particularly tragic attack in 2007 that
killed fifty-one civilians, he stated that while "the intention is very good in these
operations to figh t terrorism . .. five years on, it is very difficult for us to continue
to accept civilian casualties.":J.t Karzai contin ues to demand greater care in executing attacks endangering civilians.
A number of obstacles dramatically hindered attempts to avoid collateral damage. The enemy was scattered across the country and often operated in small
groups. The non-linear nature of this battlespace meant that operations had to be
conducted over vast areas in which the mere position of a group, vehicle or other
mobile target seldom served as a reliable indicator of its enemy character. Moreover, because neither the Taliban nor AI Qaeda fielded a classic military force, with
corresponding fixed military facilities, coalition fo rces quickly exhausted known
targets, thereby necessitating a shift to !leeting targets, which were harder to identify because of time constraints. Most targeting consequently became "dynamic."
In dynamic targeting, targets are passed to aircraft already airborne as hostile
forces are identified, thereby limiting the opportunity for com prehensive target
analysis, and requiring use of whatever weapons the aircraft happen to be armed
with at the time.
The difficulty of identifying the enemy complicated matters. Enemy forces wore
no uniforms or other distinctive clothing that allowed immediate visual identification. Merely being armed was an insufficient indicator, as Afghans in remote areas
often carry weapons for protection, and because friendly indigenous armed groups
were usually indistinguishable from the Taliban and AI Qaeda. General T. Michael
Mosely, the combined force air component commander, highlighted the operational murkiness when he noted that "in any given space-ground space--out
there, you had regular and unconventional forces, humanitarian assistance guys,
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maybe regular guys and not one of us in the command authority knew where all
those guys were. "35
Determined to avoid incidents which might delegitimize their operations, US
and coalition forces imposed wide-ranging targeting restrictions through myriad
mechanisms. These included coalition and national rules of engagement (ROE),3/)
no-strike lists (for reasons such as IHL or host-nation sensitivities), restricted target lists (in which attack requires special preapproval, e.g., due to negative cultural
implications), individual target folder3 7 restrictions (such as a requirement to use a
particular munition or str ike a particular "desired point of impact"), loint Air Operations Plans,38 execute orders,39 fragmentary orders,40 fire support coordination
measures41 and soldier cards. 42 The net result was a dense and oft confusing normative environment, one in which IHL played a minor role relative to policy and
operational considerations.43
Such restrictions deviated measurably from customary practices attendant to
attacks on individuals. The traditional approach in conventional conflict is
straightforn'ard. Typically, enemy armed fo rces, including organized armed
groups supporting the enemy, are "declared hostile," either at the outset of the
conflict or, in the latter case, once their involvement in the conflict becomes evident. Declaring fo rces hostile operationalizes the principle of distinction, which
permits attacks on combatants. It matters not whether the combatants are threatening the attacker, or even whether they represent a potential threat; status alone
renders them a lawful target. For instance, an unarmed cook may be attacked on
sight ifhe or she is a member of the armed forces.
By the principle of distinction, civilians may not be attacked unless, and for such
time as, they directly participate in hostilities.« Accordingly, although they may
not be declared hostile per se, r ules of engagement and other targeting guidance allow them to be attacked while engaging in actions that constitute direct participation. Much controversy exists over the reach of the qualifying activities, as well as
the meaning of the phrase "for such time." These issues will be dealt with later; the
point here is that it is customary for targeting guidance to permit attacks on direct
participants.
Beyond declaring fo rces hostile and incorporating direct participation into the
ROE, the third typical form of engagement authority addresses violence with no
nexus to the confli ct---criminal acts. Soldiers faced with such criminality may employ force consistent with the law of self-defense (and defense of others). Specifically, they may use deadly force to protect themselves and others against an
imminent threat of death or serious injury, when less extreme measures are unavailable. 4$ Operationally, the US rules of engagement provide that US military
personnel may use force in the face of a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile
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intent. 46 They m ay only do so when force is the sole viable o ption for addressing the
situation (principle of necessity). No more force than that required to repel the attack, or prospective attack, is permitted.
This typical three-tiered paradigm was notably altered d uring operations in Afghanistan. Although targeting practices shifted somewhat over time to meet
emerging battlefield realities, in broad terms they have been re1atively constant.
When the conflict began, the United States and its coalition partners declared no
enemy forces hostile, to include the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Instead, the "enem y"
had to represent a "likely and identifiable threat" (LIT) before being attacked.
Those not meeting this standard could only be engaged if they had committed a
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, the self-defense rule traditionally employed to respond to actions unconnected to the hostilities. During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, by contrast, the Iraqi military was declared hostile from the outset of hostilities. Similarly, "designated terrorist groups" cou1d generally be engaged in the
same fashion.47
Afghanistan represented the first use of the LIT standard in an armed conflict. It
was less permissive than the practice of declaring forces hostile because potential
targets had to manifest som e degree of threat. Paradoxically, the standard was
more permissive than the designated-terrorist-group approach applicable in Iraq
because it included no status criterion, i.e., circumstances alone justified engagement even in the absence of intelligence as to membership.
The adoption of this untested approach to engagement authority begs the question of why the standard declaration of forces hostile, com bined with direct participation and self-defense ROE, was judged insufficient. Apparently, concern over
the liberality of declaring fo rces hostile, com bined with apprehension over the potential for friend1y-fire incidents, underpinned the standard. According to one key
participant in its deve10pment at US Central Command (CENTCOM), the military headquarters for Afghanistan and Iraq operations,
I inte ntionally designed it to allow the guys in contact (Ground Forces) the ability to
engage the "enemy," such as they were, without actually being shot at first, while at the
same time limiting the ability of the guys flying at 21,000 feet and 210 knots to drop
bombs everywhere they wanted (potentially on our allies). A$ you know, when we
began operations targets (deliberate targets) were intentionally held at the highest
levels and this was a way to provide some flexibili ty to the guy in the field. "$elf Defense
Plus" is how I describe it. In theory, this gave the Air Force the ability to strike as well
(e.g. SAM batteries, anti-aircraft guns. etc). Based on the "OPLAN" I knew there would
be people (ally and enemy alike) all over the country that looked exactly the same
(white robeslturbans[,] on ho rses/pickup trucks. etc).
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Identification of the enemy was everything during this conflict. There wasn't even a
FLOT lforward line of own troops]. Eventually, the best we could do was create small
zones/boxes whe re we could say none of our people were located. You simply couldn't
tell who the enemy was from the lawn darts [slang for an F-16] and this was a way of
empowering the guys in contact to shoot or call air strikes based upon "Positive
Identification" (the totality of the circumstances). And, even with these tight rules the
conflict didn't go without incidenl. 48

The less candid, but official, CENTCOM explanation focused on the conflict's
unique nature. Central Command was intent on maintaining strict control over
attacks because it well understood the downside of collateral damage during an
insurgency. Recall also the difficulties of verifying targets, both because identification based solely on appearance was problematic and because it was often difficult to determine to which side the various armed groups owed their allegiance at
any particular time. With its comprehensive access to ISR assets, and fuller grasp
of operational and strategic considerations, CENTCOM believed that it was best
situated to distinguish friendly from hostile targets.
Yet, the command realized that a conflict of this magnitude required more
than self-defense rules. One scenario cited to justify the new standard involved
US forces encountering sleeping Taliban soldiers; another posited aircraft spotting anti-aircraft systems along the route of attack. Self-defense rules alone would
not permit attack in such situations. and it clearly would make no sense for soldiers in the field or airborne aircraft to have to "call home" for engagement authorization, merely because these lucrative targets were neither committing a hostile
act nor demonstrating hostile intent. For CENTCOM, the answer lay in the LIT
standard..f9
The level of certainty required to determine that a target qualified as a likely and
identifiable threat was also a novel feature. at least in ground operations. Likely and
identifiable threat required more than merely "suspicious people in a questionable
location."so Rather. the rules of engagement mandated positive identification
(PID) of the target as a threat before attacking it. Previously. this standard had only
been applied in the no-fly-zone-enforcement context of Operations Northern and
Southern Watch.51 Afghanistan represented its first use in ground operations. and
it unsurprisinglycaused confusio n. The meaningofPID was eventually clarified in
an unclassified format during Operation Iraqi Freedom on the Combined Forces
Land Component ROE Card: "PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target. "52 Interestingly, PID had meant something much
more in the no- Oy-zone context-almost a no-mistakes standard. 53
Accounts from soldiers and airmen , as well as judge advocates, indicate that LIT
generated confusion, in great part because it was not a standard to which combat
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forces had trained. N umerous subordinate commands urged CENTCOM to issue
guidance. 54 The new terminology also elevated form over substance, at least to an
extent. For instance,
[rJeservations of ta rgeting authority to higher levels made it extremely important fo r
team members calling for fifes to use the right terms to avoid any delays. In addition to
using terms like "positively identified" and "likely and identifiable threat" in the
req uest, the team members needed to indicate the situation requiring the fires so that
the approval was obtained at the most immediate level possible. 55

One US officer cut to the chase: "'When lawyers can easily argue about what [LIT [
means or doesn 't mean as far as engaging targets, we have failed[, [ because the 21year-old corporal doesn't have the luxury of such an academic exercise."56
Likely and identifiable threat represented a standard exceeding that required by
the relevant norms of international humanitarian law. Most significantly, it rejected the universally accepted premise that combatants, whether members of the
armed forces or of other organized armed groups, can be attacked on sight. Under
IHL, their mere status as combatants rendered them targetable. By contrast, act (or
imminent act) replaced status in the LIT standard.
LIT is a genre of the direct participation in hostilitie5--Qne without an express
"for such time" component. This should be unsurprising, since the absence of classic
conventional operations by the Taliban and Al Qaeda, combined with the difficulty
of identifying fighters as members of a particular group, meant that application of
the direct-participation notion, in some fonn, was destined to loom large.
As mentioned earlier, disagreement exists over the scope of direct participation.
For instance, while all agree that conducting an attack and gathering tactical intelligence qualify, disagreement prevails as to whether directly financing insurgents
docs. An ICRC-sponsored multiyear project to clarify matters is nearing completion. Although the final interpretive guidance on direct participation has yet to be
released, indications are that three cumulative criteria will emerge. 57
The act in question must first adversely affect (or be likely to do so) enemy military operations or capacity, or harm civilians or civilian objects. Second, there must
be a direct causal link between the act and the harm caused the enemy, or the harm
must derive from a coordinated military operation of which the act is an integral
part. This causality criterion excludes actions that may contribute in some way to
the enemy's military efforts, but which do not directly enhance its combat actions.
Finally, the act must be designed to negatively affect the enem y in support of its opponent. This belligerent nexus requirement would exclude mere criminality unconnected to the conflict. The LIT standard meets all three criteria: the threat is to
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US forces, the anticipated actions amount to hostile activity and the forces acting
are not mere criminals.
The absence of a "for such time" element in LIT raises several legal issues. Before
discussing them, it is useful to recall that they are not raised as to any individuals
who are members of an organized armed force, for, as noted, members of such
groups may be attacked regardless of whether they are directly participating.58
There is no temporal issue-as a matter oflaw-vis-a-vis them.
Those who are not members of an organized armed group, but meet the direct
participation scope threshold, may only be attacked "for such time" as they directly
participate in the hostilities. The notion of "for such time" is the source of much
contention. The ICRC Commentary to the relevant provision of Additional Protocol I, Article 51.3, provides that direct participation includes "preparations for
combat and rcturn from combat," but that " [o] nce he ceases to participate, the civilian regains his right to the protection .... "59 Individuals who have not set out to
attack their enemy are immune from attack; those who manage to make it home
following an operation regain civilian protection until they set out on another operation. Certain experts of the working group on direct participation embraced the
strict approach set forth in this non-binding commentary.
Other experts point out that this narrow approach creates a "revolving door"
through which the direct participant passes as he or she begins and completes each
mission. 60 They propose an alternative which locks the door after exit: once an individual has optcd into the hostilities, he or she remains targetable until unambiguously opting out. Opting out can occur either through extended nonparticipation demonstrating an intention to desist from further involvement, or an
affirmative act of withdrawal. Although it may be difficult to determine whether a
potential target has opted out, since the individual did not enjoy any privilege to
engage in hostilities in the first place, it is reasonable that he or she bear the risk that
the other side is unaware of withdrawal.
This is the better interpretation of direct participation. In international humanitarian law, gray areas must be interpreted in light of the law's underlying
purposes-achieving balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns.6! A revolving door would throw off this balance. It would frustrate combatants charged with combating the direct participants. and combatants frustrated
with legal norms constitute a risk to the civilian population. Additionally, the restrictive approach would paradoxically create a situation in which those entitled to
use fo rce-lawful combatants-would enjoy less protection than those not so entitled but nevertheless doing so; the forme r could be attacked at any time. whereas
the latter could only be attacked while deploying to and from an operation and
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during the operation itself. From a military necessity perspective, enemy direct
participants would unacceptably enjoy a temporal sanctuary.62
The LIT standard runs counter to the revolving-door interpretive approach. For
instance, the approach begs the question of how one responds to the sleepingfighters scenario posed by those responsible for LIT's adoption. By strict application of the revolving-door approach, the sleeping fighters could not be engaged.
LIT imposes no such constraint. Albeit sleeping, the fighters are a likely and identifiable threat. There need be no debate as to whether their sleeping falls within the
confines of deploying to or from an operation. By contrast, the alternative liberal
interpretation of direct participation tracks LIT neatly. Both allow attack in this
and similar situations in which the direct participant is taking a tactical pause. Indeed, these are precisely the sorts of scenarios posed by critics of the revolving-door
approach to convincingly point out its impracticality.
As can be seen, LIT is roughly comparable to the liberal standard of direct participation. 63 Yet, beyond questions as to the scope of the standard lies the issue of
certainty. With LIT, individuals m ust be positively identified as likely threats before being attacked. This requirement poses a num ber of practical and legal questions. Central among them is the requisite type and degree of certainty. What does
" positive" mean in practice? H ow positive? Beyond a reasonable doubt? More
likely than not? And does positive identification mean that the individual in question is likely to be a potential threat or, instead, likely to actually threaten?
Consider the requirement's application on the bewildering battlefield that is Afghanistan. What indicators should suffice in making a positive identification? Perhaps carrying weapons? Yet, many non-participants carried weapons in Afghanistan
for self-protection. Perhaps the weapons (e.g., crew-served weapons) evidenced
their status as a threat. However, recall that there were friendly indigenous forces
armed with the same type of weapons, and that identity and allegiances were difficult to discern. And what type of intelligence should be required to determine that
someone was a likely and identifiable threat? Many were available in Afghanistan,
but which sufficed? Satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery
transmitted in real time, human eyes on target, cell phone intercepts, human intelligence? Finally, there is the critical matter of whether positive identification is contextual. That is, does the criterion represent a constant in low- and high-risk
environments, or does high risk lower the threshold necessary for positive identification? In Afghanistan, both environments existed at various times and places.
Uncertainty is hardly a novel phenomenon on the battlefield. That being so,
States have tended to mandate the only level of certainty that is practicable in the
fog of war-would a reasonable warfighter in the same circumstances hesitate to
act? The US position is representative. The Commander's Ha1ldbook on tile Law of
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Naval Operations provides that" [c]ombatants in the field must make an honest determination as to whether a particular person is or is not taking a direct part in hostilities based on the person's behavior, location, and attire, and other information
available at the time."f>4
International humanitarian treaty law also addresses battlefield uncertainty. Article 50.1 of Additional Protocol 1 provides that "in case of doubt whether a person
is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be civilian."6s Obviously, the article
does not rule out doubt altogether. This is dear from the JCRC Commentary on the
provision, which notes, in an example particularly appropriate to Afghanistan, "if
combatants do not clearly distinguish themselves from the civilian population .. .,
this could result in a weakening of the immunity granted civilians and the civilian
population."66 Such weakening could occur only if engagement in the face of some
doubt was contemplated by the commentary. The UK understanding accompanying its ratification of the Protocol similarly adopts a contextual reading. It states
that "the rule ... applies only in cases of substantial doubt still remaining after [the
required assessment of the attack], and [it does not override] a commander's duty
to protect the safety of troops under his command or to preselVe his military situation, in conformity with the other provisions of the protocoL "61 The determinative
term is "substantial." Finally, the JCRe's Customary International Humanitarian
Law study reasonably finds that "it is fair to conclude that when there is a situation
of doubt, a careful assessment has to be made under the conditions and restraints
governing a particular situation as to whether there are sufficient indications to
warrant attack. One cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubiOUS."68 Use of the phrase "sufficient indications" suggests that absolute certainty
was not required.
It is unclear what LIT required beyond IHl 's "reasonable warfighter in sam e or
similar circumstances" threshold. Its positive-identification requirement, absent
clear explication to the contrary, could be interpreted as suggesting that the established IHl fram e of reference had been rejected in lieu of a more restrictive standard. But, if so, how? Complicating matters even further is the fact that the concept
of positive identification had been adopted in other contexts. For instance, it was
adopted for "kill or capture" operations to heighten the preconditions over those
applying during a "capture or detain" operation. 69 So, does PID m ean different
things in different types of operations? Whatever it does mean, it is clear that PlO
was at least as restrictive as IH L-in all likelihood more so in application.
Another aspect of targeting in Afghanistan relevant to an JHl analysis was the
requirement that attacks be cleared at specified levels of command. As noted by
one director of combat operations in the Combined Air Operations Center during
Operation Anaconda,
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[tlhe ROE was not there to go out and do a conventional fight. Under the rules of
engagement for Operation Enduring Freedom, pre-planned strikes, interdiction
targets and time-sensitive targets all had to be approved by USCENTCOM; and for the
most part, the USCENTCOM/J-2 and legal advisors ... drove what we did and did not
target. 70

His comments exemplified the concerns senior leadership had about operations
going awry, even in the remotest of areas. 71
This raises the issue of approval level. The Anaconda requirements exceeded
even those found in the CDEM approval process. Yet, IHl imposes no level of
strike approval tied to likely levels of civilian harm. In great part, this is because law
is contextual. The degree oflawful civilian harm is determined by reference to the
military advantage accruing from the attack in question. "Those who plan or decide upon an attack" must also take feasible (practical in the circumstances) precautions in attack.72 In other words, the law lies where it falls--on those planning,
approving or executing attacks, whoever they might be. This tightening of the restrictions over and above what IHL required demonstrated the extent to which Afghanistan ROE and CDEM approval levels reflected an understanding that
unintended civilian harm can have extra- normative consequences.
The two remaining IHL issues raised by targeting operations in Afghanistan are
the principle of proportionality and requirement to take feasible precautions in attack. For a number of practical reasons, proportionality posed few concerns. From
an operational perspective, the population was widely dispersed, engagements often occurred in remote areas and no major urban battles took place. Precision munitions were generally available when called for and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance assets, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles, could be used to assess and monitor target areas, often in real time.
Counterinsurgency doctrine and practices also minimized the play of the proportionality principle in the conflict. As noted, counterinsurgency doctrine puts a
high premium on the avoidance of collateral damage; in Afghanistan, even attacks
which were dearly proportionate were often avoided. However, counterinsurgency affects application of the principle in a Jess obvious fashion.
In conventional operations. proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian
terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage
gained. But in COIN operations, advantage is best calculated not in terms of how many
insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained. If
certain key insurgent leaders are essential to the insurgents' ability to conduct
operations, then military leaders need to consider their relative importance when
determining how best to pursue them. In COIN environments, the number of civilian
lives lost and property destroyed needs to be measured against how much harm the
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targeted insurgent could do if allowed to escape. If the target in question is relatively
inconsequential, then proportionality requires combatants to forego [sic] severe action,
or seek noncombative means of engagement. 73

This extract from the COIN m anual is overstated. As a matter oflaw, the military
importance of the individuals targeted is always relevant, whether in conventional
or coun terinsurgency operations. However, the fact that the goal of an insurgency
is not attrition of enemy forces means that the military advantage of killing a simple
fighter is likely not as high as during attrition warfare, in which victory is achieved
through serial destruction of enemy forces.
Reduced to basics, in Afghanistan the operational concern was the mere fact of
collateral damage, not whether that damage expected to be caused was excessive
relative to m ilitary advantage. Rules of engagement so embraced this casualty aversion that the legal principle of proportionality never loomed large.
The case of human shields exemplifies the extent to which, in the context of proportionality, policy and operational considerations swallowed legal requirements.
Human Rights Watch has documented the Taliban's widespread use of hwnan
shields,'4 acts which undeniably violated international humanitarian law.'5
Many experts correctly argue that voluntary shields are direct participants in
hostilities who, therefore, do not factor into proportionality calculations. As to involuntary shielding, the practice most prominent in Afghanistan, the weight of
opinion holds that its victims remain civilians factored fully into any proportionality analysis. 76 This approach reflects Additional Protocol I, Article 51 .8's caveat that
"any violation of . .. [inter alia, the provision prohibiting the use of shields 1shall
not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the
civilian population and civilians .. . ." 77
There have been no serious allegations that US forces ever ignored the presence
ofhwnan shields. On the contrary, CDEM specifically mandates consideration of
the presence of human shields; such presence elevates the required approval level.
Recall also that rules of engagement and other operational guidelines in Afghanistan often req uired US forces to withdraw if the enemy was collocated with civilians. Because US forces were already bound by policy and operational
requirements exceeding those of IHL, the use of human shields neither complicated application of the existing legal norms nor created pressure for a relaxed interpretation thereof.
Counterinsurgency operations raise a final theoretical question as to proportionality: Does collateral damage directly influence the degree of military advantage accruing from an attack (as distinct from the determination of whether
collateral damage is excessive relative to military advantage)? An analogous issue is
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force protection. During Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft flew at altitudes
outside the threat envelope of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia air defenses. Albeit
counterfactual. allegations surfaced that this tactic heightened risk to the civilian
population. The affair has generated a lively academic debate over whether survival
of the aircrew and aircraft should be considered military advantage when making
proportionality calculations.78
The case of Afghanistan presents the opposite case. If aircrew and aircraft survival enhance military advantage. does the counterproductive nature of collateral
damage during a counterinsurgency detract from it? After all. avoidance of collateral damage constitutes an express objective in such conflicts.
Although it is not the place to resolve this complex issue. it is important to understand that, as a rule. military advantage is typically viewed as advantage benefiting frie ndly operations or hindering the enemy's.79 The notion does not extend to
winning hearts and minds, a point illustrated by agreement that destroying enemy
civilian morale does not qualify as advantage vis-a.-vis the definition of military objective. so Rather. military advantage is purely military in nature; there must be
some direct contribution to military operations. Political, economic or social advantage does not suffice.
This being so, any assertion that collateral damage should diminish military advantage would have to be supported by a direct nexus to military factors . While
true that collateral damage motivates civilian sympathy for the enemy. such general effects are too attenuated. As a general rule, then, collateral damage plays no
part in proportionality calculations beyond being measured against the yardstick
of excessiveness.
The final area of consideration is the requirement to take precautions in attack. Codified in Additional Protocol I. Article 57, it requires an attacker to minimize collateral damage by taking feasible steps to avoid and. in any event,
minimize "incidental loss of civilian life. injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects." Precautions include both target verification and choosing among available targets. weapons and tactics so as to lessen the impact of an attack on the civilian population.
In modern conflicts, critics increasingly condemn targeting operations for failure to comply with the requirement. This phenomenon results. in part, from the
fact that the globalized media and non-governmental organizations. employing
modern communications technology. have a powerful ability to focus attention on
civilian casualties and harm to civilian objects. Collateral damage is easily grasped
when viewed in the media; understanding the complexity of mounting a modern
attack is not. Thus, perceptions can become distorted.
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Further, the availability of advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, especially UAVs and precision weaponry, such as the small-diameter
bomb,S] has created the false impression that technology makes "zero collateral
damage" attacks possible. The result is a recurring sense that failure to take precautions is the only possible explanation for civilian damage, injuries and deaths. 82
Reports on US and coalition operations in Afghanistan exemplify this tendency.
For instance, the Human Rights Watch report on the conflict, Troops in Contact,
asserts that "[tJhe cases described here raise concerns as to whether the attacking
forces acted in accordance with their obligation under the laws of war to exercise
'constant care to spare the civilian population' and take 'all feasible precautions' to
minimize loss of civilian life."s3
Human Rights Watch displayed a sophisticated understanding of targeting procedures during the conflict. The organization found that "when aerial bombing is
planned, mostly against suspected Taliban targets, US and NATO forces in Afghanistan have had a very good record of minimizing harm to civilians .... "84 It
explained,

us

[p Ilanned attacks allow the
and NATO to use civilian risk mitigation procedures,
including formal risk estimates to model and minimize civilian casualties. This
includes a "pattern of life analysis," which looks for civilians in the area for hours or
days before an attack using "eyes on the target" ranging from ground observers to
technical reconnaissance. According to NATO Judge AdvocateGeneral (JAG) staff, the
US and NATO also require positive visual identification of the target during a planned
strike, allowing the pilot to look for civilians and call off an attack based on those
observations. Planned strikes also allow the US and NATO to develop a target over
time, thereby using far more detailed intelligence to understand who is and is not in the
target area. SS

Most casualties were caused, by contrast, during non-preplanned strikes. These
TIC situations occurred when US or coalition forces came upon the enemy unexpectedly. Although the rules of engagement provided that forces should withdraw
when civilians were in the vicinity of an attack, doing so was not always possible.
For instance, it might expose them to greater risks or the path of retreat may have
been cut offby the enemy. The report also pointed to cases which "began as TICs
but lasted for several hours or days, with airstrikes used to support small troop
numbers on the ground resulting in civilian deaths."86
Human Rights Watch expressed numerous concerns about such engagements.
With regard to TICs that developed into prolonged battles, the organization
opined that the resulting civilian casualties "suggest [edJ that the US is not taking
all feasible precautions during prolonged battles, including using adequate forces
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to minimize civilian harm, employing low-<ollateral damage bombs, and positively identifying the locations of combatants and civilians."81 It also suggested that
while preplanned attacks involved intricate procedures to determine the presence
of civilians, during a TIC the "tactical collateral damage assessment performed by
the Joint Terminal Attack Controller OTAC), a service member qualified in directing airstrikes on the ground [,] is one of the only checks done, and, of necessity,
such assessments often are made under the stress of hostile fire."68
While Troops in emltad is the best report produced by the organization on international humanitarian law in recent conflicts,89 its analysis of the precautions in
attack norms misses several key points. As it did in its report on Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Human Rights Watch appears to have imposed a rebuttable presumption that collateral damage evidences a failure to take sufficient precautions in attack. This shifts the burden to the attacker, who by this approach must
demonstrate that it complied with precautions norms. That this is so is illustrated
by a flawed tendency to allege failure to take feasible precautions without identifying or developing those which were presumably available, but ignored.
"Feasible precautions" have been defined as "precautions which are practicable
or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.»9O Consider the suggestions
cited above. Albeit reasonable in the abstract, there is no support in the report for
the proposition that they were feasible in the sense of being practical in the circumstances at hand. For instance, were additional troops on hand that could have been
deployed to minimize civilian harm? Or were low-collateral-damage bombs
readily available, either at bases from which aircraft launched or aboard the attacking aircraft (since many attacks were conducted by aircraft to which targets were
passed while already airborne)? As to the fact that only JT ACs generally had eyes on
target, one must query what the alternative might have been. What seems to have
been missed is that, as a matter of law, the feasible- precautions-in-attack requirements only apply when there are practical alternatives available to the attacker. The
burden of demonstrating non-compliance lies with those asserting violation of the
requirements, not the forces executing the attack.
In contrast to the LIT criterion for engagement, self-defense was much clearer,
since it is a standard to which US and other forces train and with which they are,
therefore, familiar. Self-defense presents no status issues because anyone against
whom self-defense is necessary can be engaged. Further, it poses no directparticipation-in-hostilities concerns, because only those who are actually attacking, or about to attack, are liable to being engaged defensively. Accordingly, neither
the scope nor the timing debates infecting direct-participation analysis, and, correspondingly, the LIT criterion, surface.
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Be that as it may, even self-defense proved troublesome in Afghanistan. As is often the case with application of rules of engagement, mission accomplishment
standards tended to slip into application of self-defense principles.91 The conditio n
precedent for acting in self-defense is either a hostile act o r a demonstration ofhostile intent.92 For US forces, this standard is codified in the Standing Rules of Engagement. Both criteria reflect the self-defense concept of military necessity, by
which force m ay only be used if lesser means of addressing the threat are likely not
to suffice.
In preparing for combat in Afghanistan, "considerable time and effort was spent
attempting to create training packages aimed at developing a specific level ofidentification before either returning fire or taking other actions in response to a hostile
act or demonstration of hostile intent. "91 Identification has no place in self-defense
situations, other than to locate the source of the hostile act or demonstration of
hostile intent. It is instead an element of mission accomplishment rules of engagement, by which forces are authorized to attack combatants and direct participants
only once they have been reliably identified as such.
It is well-accepted that intermingling m ission accomplishment and self-de fense
no tio ns in rules of engagem ent risks causing those who need to act in self-defense
to hesitate, thereby endangering themselves and o thers in their units. Moreover,
US training emphasizes that there is no need to seek higher approval in self-defense
situations, for delay may impede the ability of troops to defend themselves. It is
o nly in mission accomplishment rules of engagement that engagem ent approval
levels appear. Conflating the two types of rules of engagement can confuse troops
at the tactical level, causing them to act precipitously when they should be seeking
higher approval in a mission accomplishment engagement.
A further self-defense complication derived from the fact that US and NATO
forces operated in the sam e theater. Both used "hostile intent" as a criterion for
employing airpower in defensive operations employing airpower.9-I However,
NATO defined the term as " manifest and overwhelming" force, whereas the US
standard was " the threat of imminent use of force.''9S In other words, the NATO
standard placed greater emphasis on the necessity criterion of self-defense and was
more restrictive temporally. Employing the sam e term differently created confusion regarding the availability of air support in TIC situations, especially when US
and NATO forces were supporting each other. It also created an impression that
the US forces were quick to pull the trigger. As one ambassador in the country told
Human Rights Watch, "[slome Afghans think the US is worse than the Russians.
The problem is in the TI C they call in air support in a hurry, and special forces go
too far o n the ground and call in airstrikes too often. There is a cultural problem
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with the US-they are cowboys. ' '96 Since counterinsurgencies seek support of the
population, such perceptions, whether correct or not, prove costly.
Finally, the mere notion of a self-defense rule of engagement is misplaced in
armed conflicts. This is so not only because combatants are always lawful targets,
but also due to the fact that the concept of direct participation already permits engaging anyone who is attacking or about to attack. The debate over the scope of direct participation has no bearing in this regard; all sides agree that acts which
constitute a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile intent in the self-defense sense
qualify as acts of direct participation . The controversy over the "for such time" criterion is equally irrelevant, since the term undeniably includes the period when an
attack is imminent or under way (the self-defense period).
Consequently, the only legally relevant circumstance for self-defense during an
armed conflict is defense against those who do not meet the scope requirements of
direct participation, specifically that requiring a belligerent nexus to the hostilities.
Expanding self-defense beyond such situations by giving it a central role in engagement guidance was, therefore, un usual as an operational matter and unnecessary
as a matter of law. Doing so represented yet another policy and operational decision ratcheting back what was allowed by international humanitarian law.

Concluding Th oughts
What is fascinating about the application of tHl in Afghanistan (and other recent
conflicts) is that its foundational premise seems to have been turned on its head.
International humanitarian law is designed fo r classic attrition warfare, where each
side tries to so wear down the enemy forces that they can no longer continue fighting. The S1. Petersburg Declaration principle that law fixes the "limits at which the
necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity" comported
neatly with warfare along such lines.97 Both sides sought to avoid excessive restrictions on their military actions, but both also wanted to ensure the protection of
their civilian populations. Military necessity and civilian hann were counterpoised
In a zero-sum game.
However, this traditional balance began to be stressed by the emergence of coercive warfare, in which the objective is not to defeat the enemy, but rather to affect a
decisionmaker's calculations. NATO's air campaign in 1999 (Operation Allied
Force), during which the goal was to convince Slobodan Milosevic to stop slaughtering the Kosovar Albanians and return to the negotiating table, best illustrates
coercive warfare in the contemporary context.98 The dilemma was that some of
those assets, the destruction of which would most effectively have such effects
(such as property owned by the State's leader), qualified as protected civilian
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property under international humanitarian law. The ensuing calls for a relaxation
of the lex lata should have come as no surprise.99
Counterinsurgency warfare, in that it seeks to win hearts and minds, constitutes
"persuasive" warfare, that is, warfare designed to influence the population of the
State in which an insurgency is under way, and, to a lesser extent, international
public and governmental opinion. Since collateral damage hinders military operations by undercutting domestic and international support and by increasing insurgent strength, strict compliance with IHL norms actually complements military
necessity. Accordingly, as in Afghanistan, counterinsurgent forces often adopt restrictions on their operations that far outstrip those found in the law. Humanitarians and counterinsurgency warfighters paradoxically find themselves in lockstep.
Their perspectives on the practices may, nevertheless, conflict. Although the restrictions originate as context-specific operational and policy choices, humanitarians tend to style them as normative. As a matter of law, the crux of the issue is
whether such restrictions comprise State practice bearing on the emergence of customary international law norms.
The ICRe's Customary International Humanitarian Law study notes that "both
physical and verbal acts of States constitute practice that contributes to the creation
of customary international law. Physical acts include, for example, battlefield behavior. ... Verbal acts include military manuals ... instructions to armed and security forces, military communiques during war .... "100 But what must be emphasized
is that State practice matures into customary law only when it evidences opitlio
juris sive necessitatis, a belief on the part of States engaging in said practice that it is
legally obligatory.10i Clearly, the extensive restrictions placed on US and coalition
forces in Afghanistan did not result from legal concerns, but rather apprehension
that even legal collateral damage would prove counterproductive in the specific
context of Afghanistan. In other words, they did not rise to the level of State practice which would evidence the emergence of international humanitarian law
norms more restrictive than those already extant.
Be that as it may, warfighters, commentators andjudge advocates often conllate
the distinction between humanitarian law and rules of engagement (and other engagement mandates). The latter include not only elements of law, but also operational and policy dictates. Because ROE are the actual norms applicable on a
battlefield, many observers lose sight of the difference, thereby distorting assessments of State practice. 102 One can imagine that the CDEM process, for instance,
might foster expectations that greater collateral damage requires a higher level of
approval authority. Similarly, the LIT concept risks suggesting that there is no longer any military necessity in declaring combatants hostile, as permitted in IHL.

328

Mich ael N. Schm itt
Ultimately, the conduct of hostilities in Afghanistan illustrated a shift from law
toward legitimacy. As governments, non-governmental organizations, academics
and others raise expectations, there is decreasing emphasis on strict legal analysis.
In Afghanistan, for instance, authorization to conduct attacks which would otherwise comport with the proportionality principle was sometimes denied as risking "bad press" or negative communicative consequence. The requirement to
take feasible precautions in attack seems to be slowly slipping toward a standard
of all possible precautions.
Clearly, law is playing a lesser role in targeting than it has in past conflicts. This
lesson has not been lost on enemy forces, who increasing employ lawfare-the use
oflaw as a "weapon" employed to create the impression, correct or not, that an opponent acts lawlessly, thereby undercutting support for the war effort. IOl in the face
of this strategy, there is even greater motivation for operating at levels of caution
far exceeding the IHL's mandates. But doing so only exacerbates the blurring oflegal, policy and operational practices.
Prosecuting a conflict to the limit of the law to prevent erosion of the military
necessity aspect ofinternational humanitar ian law is self-evide ntly not the answer.
At least in a counterinsurgency doing so would sacrifice victory on the altar of principle. Nevertheless, rules of engagement and other targeting restrictions should be
crafted in a way that reflects the content, structure, function and accepted terminology of this body of law. Afghanistan should serve as a warning that understanding and comm unicating the difference between law, on the one hand, and
operational and policy choices, on the other, remains imperative.

Notes
I. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims oflntemational Armed Conflicrsart. 49.1, June B, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
reprinted in DocuM£NTSON THE LAWs OF WAR 422 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff 005., 3d
ed. 2(00) [hereinafter AP I].
2. The accepted definition of international armed conflict is found in Common Article 2 of
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions: ~ { A] II cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more [States]. even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them." Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafterGC 1]; Con·
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at $ea art. 2,Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.s.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.B5 [hereinafterGC II ];Con.
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC 1Il]; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]: aU reprinted in id. at 197,222, 244 and 301, respectively.
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3. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, The Applirnbility of the Geneva COllventions to the UGlobal War on
Terrorism," 46 VIRGINtA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL U.W 165, 177-90 (2005). In 2002, Presi·
dent George Bush concluded that the conflict with AI Qaeda was uinternational in scope." Mem·
orandum from George W. Bush to the Vice President et ai., Subject: Humane Treatment of AI
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees para. 2(e) (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROADTO ABU GHRAIB 134 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2(05). Four years later, the
Supreme Co urt disagreed, finding a conflict with transnational terrorists to be unot of an inter·
national character, ~ as that tenn is em ployed in Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conven·
tions. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 1265.0.2749,2795-97 (2006). The International Committee of
the Red Cross takes the position that transnational terrorism, absent a nexus to either an in terna·
tional or non-international armed conflict, fails to quality as an anned conflict in the first place.
See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN U.W
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFUCfS 7-8, available at http://www
.icrc.orgIWeb/englsiteengO.nsflhtmlallJihl-30·intemational-conference-I 0 I207/SFildIHL-challenges
-30th-International-Conference-ENG.pdf [hereinfter IHL and the Challenges of Contemporary
Armed Conflicts] .
4. Despite its illegitimacy, and non-recognition by most States, the Taliban constitu ted the
de facto government of Afghanistan in that it controlled the greatest amount of territory and
generally exercised the normal functions of governance. Ai; noted by Yoram Dinstein, "[nlo for·
mal recognition is required by a belligerent State as to the statehood of the opposing side. As long
as the adversary satisfies objective criteria of statehood under in ternational law, any armed con·
flict between two belligerent Parties would be characterized as inter-State. ~ YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE CONDUCt" OF HOSTILITIES IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICt" 16 (2004).
Therefore, in humani tarian law terms, the conflict in Afghanistan between the Taliban forces
(and organized anned gro ups supporting the Taliban) and the US- led coalition was an interna·
tional armed conflict.
5. S.c. Res. 1419, U.N. Doc. S/RES/14I9 (June 26, 2(02). Additional Protocolll to the
Geneva Conventions, which addresses non-in ternational armed conflict, does not apply to the
conflict because Afghanistan is not a party to th e instrument; even if it was, the conflict would
not meet the threshold criteria set forth in Article 1.1 . Protocol Addi tional to th e Geneva Con·
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts art. 1.1, June 8,1977,1125 U.N.T.5. 609, reprinted in o.:x:UMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 1, at 483. However, the conflict does meet the th reshold criteria of
Common Article 3, to which Afghanistan is a party, as an "armed conflict not of an international
character," as well as those contained in customary international law. GC I, II, Ill, IV, supra note 2,
art. 3; MICHAEL N. $CHMITI, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & ¥ORAM DINSfEIN, THE MANUAL ON
THE U.WOF NON-iNTERNATIONALAlU.iED CONFLICt", Rule 1.1.1 and accompanyingcommen.
lary (2006), reprinted in 36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) (Special Supplement),
available at http://www.michaelschmitt.orglimages!Manual%5BI%5D.Final.BriU..pdf [herein.
after NIAC Manuall.
6. This is the position taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC). See
IH L and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 3, at 8. However, some
experts see a continuing international armed conflict, existing beside the non-international one,
with AI Qaeda and related transnational terrorist gro ups.
7. AP 1, supra note 1, art. 48. In th e Tadiccase, the In terna tional Criminal Tribunal for the
fonner Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber held that the principle of distinction, which lies at the heart
of the law of targeting, applies in non-international armed conflict. By the decision, customary
rules had developed to govern Uinternal strife," covering
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such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate
attacks, protection of civilian objecrs, in particular cultural property, protection of all
those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of
means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain
methods of conducting hostilities.
Prosecu tor v. Tadic, Case No. IT·94·1, Decision on Defence Motion for lnterlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction para. 127 (O;.:t. 2, 1995). The Tribunal cited General Assembly Resolution 2444,
which recognized the Unecessityof applying basic hwnanitarian principles in aI/armed confliCL"
Id., para. 110, citing G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), U.N. Doc. AJ7218 (Dec. 19, 1968), Respect for
Hu man Rights in Armed Conflicts. reprinted ill THE LAWS Of ARMED CONfLICt" 511 (Dietrich
Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 20(4). The United States later recognized the Resolution as
Kdeclara tory of existing customary international law." Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, General
Counselofthe Department of Defense , to Senator Edward Kennedy (Sept. 22, 1972), excerpted in
A. Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relllting to lTJternational Law, 67
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118, 122 (1973). See also NIAC Manual, supra
note 5, at 11; CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 25-29 (Rule 7 and
accompanying commentary) (Jean·Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005)
(hereinafter CIHLS]; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS Of 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GE.NEVA CONVENTIONS Of 12 AUGUST 1949 para. 4761 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmennann eds., 1987) (hereinafter AP I Commentary].
8. The USArmy has cited complexity as a major factor in future operations. In particular, it
points to three especially relevant manifestations: complex physical terrain, complex human terrain and complex infonnational terrain.
In the face of overwhelming U.S. combat power, future adversaries can be expected to
conduct operations more frequently from the shelter of complex physical terrain (urban,
jungle/forest, and mo un tain). Such terrain typically comprises a mosaic of open
patches and highly restrictive terrain, with the potential to minimize exposure to
superior firepower, inflict higher U.S. casualties, and prolong the conflict. Urban
defenses, in particular, will tend to reduce U.S. advantages in overhead information
collection, tactical mobility, and long-range precision fires, instead placing a premium
on dismoun ted maneuver, direct fires, ground reconnaissance, HUMINT, and the
troop strength needed to conduct them.
An urban setting also invites adversaries to exploit public sensitivities to collateral
damage and civilian casualties, and tends to magnify the perceived cosrs of protracted
conflict ... .
Complex human terrain exisrs where nu merous population gro ups coexist in the same
physical space-often a city or an urbanized area. These might include ethno-linguistic
gro ups, political factions, tribes or clans, religious seers, or ideological movemenrs.
Identification of combatants in complex human terrain is extraordinarily difficult;
applying force in such an environment imposes a high risk of counterproductive or
unintended consequences.
Finally, complex informational terrain is the multiple sources or transmission paths for
communications, data, or information-including news media. A force operating in
complex informational terrain will not have the ability to control information flow.
U.s. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pam. 525·3·0, The Army in Join t
Operations: The Anny's Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024, at 44 (2005).
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9. For a general descri ption of Afghanistan, see Central InteUigence Agency, The World
Factbook, Afghanistan (2008), https://www.cia.govllibrary/publicationslthe.world-factbookl
geoslaf.html (last visited Mar. 11,2(09).
10. This approach reversed the standard tactic of ground forces driving the enemy into areas
where it can be attacked by airpower. In Afghanistan, air attacks often did the opposite, with air
forces driving the enemy into areas where it could be engaged by ground forces.
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